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LABOR LAW-NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT-DUTY TO
BARGAIN OVER PARTIAL CLOSINGS-The United States Supreme
Court had held that although an employer who terminated a con-
tract with one of its commercial customers purely for economic
reasons was required to bargain with the union about the effects
of its decision, there was no duty to bargain with the union
about the decision itself.
First National Maintenance Corp. v. National Labor Relations
Board, 452 U.S. 666 (1981)
First National Maintenance Corporation (FNM), a New York
corporation, provides housekeeping, cleaning, maintenance, and
related services to commercial customers. It supplies contracted-
for labor and supervision for a fixed fee plus labor costs.' FNM
hires its personnel separately for each customer and does not
transfer employees between locations. In 1976, FNM and Green-
park Care Center (Greenpark) entered into a contract which
specified that Greenpark would pay FNM a management fee of
500 dollars a week in addition to the gross weekly payroll and
fringe benefits.' This weekly fee was subsequently reduced to
250 dollars effective November 1, 1976.3
Greenpark in March 1977, issues a thirty days' written notice
of cancellation to FNM because of inefficiency.' The cancellation
never became effective, but FNM realized that it was losing
money and on June 30, 1977 asked Greenpark to restore its
management fee to the 500-dollar figure. FNM informed Green-
park that if an increase were not granted by August 1, FNM
would discontinue its operation at Greenpark'
1. First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 668 (1981).
See First National Maintenance Corp., 242 N.L.R.B. 462 (1979).
2. 452 U.S. at 668. Under the contract Greenpark also furnished all
necessary supplies. The contract prohibited Greenpark from hiring any of
FNM's employees for the duration of the contract and for 90 days thereafter.
Id.
3. Id. at 668.
4. Id. at 669. The 30-day written notice of cancellation was specified by
provisions of the contract. The cancellation did not become effective and work
was extended beyond the 30-day period. Id.
5. Id. On July 25, 1977, FNM gave final notice of termination by telegram.
Id.
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During this period, FNM's employees at Greenpark selected a
labor union as their bargaining agent.' While the Greenpark con-
tract was still in effect, FNM was notified of the union's cer-
tification and its right to bargain on behalf of FNM's employees.'
On July 28, without consulting the union, FNM notified its
thirty-five employees of their discharge because of the termina-
tion of the Greenpark contract.8 The union, hearing of FNM's in-
tention to discharge the employees, requested a delay to
bargain.9 Because of FNM's refusal to bargain and its termina-
tions of the Greenpark operation and discharge of its employees,
the union filed an unfair labor practice charge against FNM
alleging that it had violated sections 8(a)(1) and (5) of the National
Labor Relations Act (Act).10
The administrative law judge, relying on the National Labor
Relations Board's (Board) holding in Ozark Trailers, Inc. " that
the closing of one plant was a mandatory subject of bargaining,
determined that FNM had breached its duty to bargain with the
union about the termination of the Greenpark contract and the
ensuing effects on its employees." The administrative law judge
6. Id. On March 31, 1977, at a Board-conducted election, a majority of the
employees selected District 1199, National Union of Hospital and Health Care
Employees, Retail, Wholesale, and Department Store Union AFL-CIO as their
bargaining agent. Id.
7. Id. at 669. The union was certified on May 11, 1977. Id. at 669, n.3.
8. Id. The discharge was to become effective August 1, 1977. Because of a
90-day hiring limitation clause included in the contract, Greenpark refused to
hire the FNM employees as part of its staff. Id. at 669-70.
9. Id. at 669. FNM's secretary-treasurer, Leonard Marsh, informed Ed-
ward Wecker, the union's vice-president, that the termination was "purely a
matter of money" and that the 30-day notice provision of the Greenpark con-
tract made staying on beyond August 1 prohibitively expensive. Id. at 669-70.
10. Id. at 670. See National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C.
sections 158(a)(1) and (5) (1976). Section 158(a)(1) provides: "[Ilt shall be an unfair
labor practice for an employer to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees
in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7. Section 158(a)(5) provides:
"[I]t shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to bargain collec-
tively with the representatives of his employees..."
11. 161 N.L.R.B. 561 (1966) (employer's decision to close one of multiple
plants was a mandatory subject of bargaining because it directly affected terms
and conditions of employment). See National Labor Relations Act, as amended,
29 U.S.C. section 158(d) (1976) which provides in pertinent part: "[Fior the pur-
poses of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual
obligation of the employer and the representatives of the employees to meet at
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment..
12. 452 U.S. at 670-71.
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found it obvious that this discharge was a change in condition of
employment."3 He further found that there was no capital
reallocation involved in the termination of the Greenpark opera-
tion and that the closing represented neither a substantial effect
on the conduct of business, nor did it have a substantial effect on
the size of the total operation." The administrative law judge
recommended that FNM be required to bargain in good faith
about the decision to close as well as about the effects of the ter-
mination and that FNM be required to pay the employees
backpay.'5 The Board adopted this recommendation and addi-
tionally required FNM to make provisions for job reinstatement
at Greenpark, or at its other operations if work was not recom-
menced at Greenpark.'"
Enforcing the Board's order, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit" held that FNM had a duty to
bargain with the union about the decision to close its Greenpark
operations. 8 The court of appeals stated that there is no per se
rule imposing a duty to bargain over a partial closing decision.' 9
Rather, the court found that there is a rebuttable presumption
that an employer has a duty to bargain over a closing of a part
of one of its operations." This presumption could be rebutted,
the court stated, by a showing that in a particular case the pur-
pose of the Act would not be advanced by the imposition of a
duty to bargain."
13. Id.
14. Id. at 670-71 & n.5.
15. Id. at 671. He recommended that FNM be required to pay the discharg-
ed employees backpay from the date of discharge until a bargaining agreement
was reached, the bargaining reached impasse, or the union failed to request
timely bargaining. Id.
16. Id. at 671-72.
17. First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 627 F.2d 596, 603 (2d Cir.
1980), rev'd, 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
18. 452 U.S. at 672.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 672 & n.7. The court relied on the Third Circuit's holding in
Brockway Motor Trucks v. NLRB, 528 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1978). See infra notes
79-80 and accompanying text. The Brockway court established a rebuttable
presumption that there is a duty to bargain. See 528 F.2d at 734-35.
21. Id. at 672. The court noted that the presumption could be rebutted
where bargaining over the decision would prove useless; the decision was due
to a financial emergency; the practice throughout the industry was not to
bargain over such decisions. The court rejected the Brockway court's approach
of balancing the employer's and employee's interests in bargaining to determine
if the presumption was rebuttable in a particular case. Id.
1982]
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To resolve the conflict among the circuits' and the inconsis-
tent rulings of the Board23 on whether there is a mandatory duty
to bargain in good faith regarding the partial closing of a
business, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that under the cir-
cumstances present in First National, the employer's need to
operate freely in deciding to close part of its business for purely
economic reasons outweighs the benefits that the union could
possibly gain through participation in making that decision. The
Court stated that the decision to close itself is not a part of the
subjects of mandatory bargaining under section 8(d) of the Act.25
Speaking for the majority," Justice Blackmun stated that the
major purpose of the Act is to maintain industrial peace and
preserve interstate commerce through the promotion of collec-
tive bargaining as a means of defusing and channeling conflict
between labor and management.27 He observed that although the
22. 452 U.S. at 672-73. The decision of the court of appeals in First Na-
tional was inconcsistent with other circuits which did not find a duty to bargain
over any management decision involving a major capital investment, a basic
operational change, or unless a violation of section 8(b)(3) is found. See Royal
Typewritter v. NLRB, 533 F.2d 1030 (8th Cir. 1976) (no duty to bargain where
an operational change has taken place); NLRB v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 361
F.2d 512 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 351 (1966) (no duty to bargain
over discontinuation of warehouse cheese processing operation); NLRB v.
Adams Dairy, 350 F.2d 108 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1011 (1966)
(employer's decision to terminate the distribution part of its dairy business and
sell its products to independent distributors was not a mandatory subject of
bargaining because it involved a major capital investment). Id. at 672-73 &
nn.8-9. For a discussion of section 8(b)(3), see infra note 42.
23. See National Car Rental Systems, Inc., 252 N.L.R.B. No. 27, 15 (1980)
(employer's decision to terminate car leasing operations not a mandatory sub-
ject of bargaining because it affected the scope of the entire business and in-
volved capital investment); see also Summit Tooling Co., 195 N.L.R.B. 479
(1972) (decision to close a subsidiary not a mandatory subject of bargaining
because effect was similar to going out of business entirely); cf. Ozark Trailers,
Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 561 (1966) (employer's decision to shut down one of many
plants was a mandatory subject of bargaining because it was a decision directly
effecting "terms and conditions of employment").
24. First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 449 U.S. 1076 (1981).
25. 452 U.S. at 686. See supra note 11.
26. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stewart, White, Powell, Rehnquist,
and Stevens joined in the majority opinion.
27. 452 U.S. at 674. See National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 29
U.S.C. section 151(1) (1976). Congress further enhanced the collective bargaining
process by creating the National Labor Relations Board and empowering it to
condemn certain conduct by unions and employers as unfair labor practices. See
NLRB v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
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parties may bargain about any subject, section 8(d) of the Act
limits mandatory bargaining to concerns of "wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment.""8 Accordingly, the
Court reasoned that Congress deliberately left the language of
section 8(d) broad to allow the Board to define the scope of man-
datory bargaining in light of specific situations. Despite the
broad statutory language, however, Justice Blackmun maintained
that there is a limit to the scope of the mandatory subjects of
bargaining.'
The Court, examining various types of management decisions,
ascertained that some have only an indirect impact on the
employment relationship' while others are more closely related
to it." The Court, however, found that First National involved a
third type of management decision, one that had a direct impact
on employment but also focused on the economic profitability of
the contract.2
Considering FNM's contention that it had no duty to bargain
concerning the termination of its Greenpark operations, Justice
Blackmun examined whether the termination alone should be
part of FNM's freedom to manage its business affairs unrelated
to employment.' The Court stated that the practice of man-
28. 452 U.S. at 674. See National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 29
U.S.C. section 158(d) (1976). A unilateral change regarding a subject in this
category is a violation of the statutory duty to bargain and subjects the of-
fender to the Board's sanctions. Id. at 674-75. See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736
(1962).
29. 452 U.S. at 675. Mandatory subjects generally include only those issues
that center around resolution of problems in the employee-employer relation-
ship. Id. at 675, n.13. See Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488 (1979) (no duty
to bargain over decision to sell a retail outlet to an independent distributor).
But see Fibreboard Paper Products v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964) (decisions to
subcontract work out held to be a mandatory subject of bargaining); Teamsters
v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283 (1959) (subcontracting out of work to prevent plant clos-
ing constituted a mandatory subject of bargaining).
30. 452 U.S. at 676-77. Such management decisions include choice of adver-
tising and promotion, product design, and financial arrangements. Id. See
Fibreboard Paper Products v. NLRB, 379 U.S. at 233 (Stewart, J., concurring).
31. 452 U.S. at 677. Such decisons include successive layoffs and recalls,
production quota and work rules. Id.
32. Id. The Court reached this conclusion because although jobs were
eliminated by the termination, the decison also involved a change in the scope
of enterprise. Id.
33. Id. at 677. FNM was obligated to bargain about the results of its deci-
sion to terminate its contract with Greenpark. FNM complied with the Board's
order and negotiated with the union regarding severance pay. Id. at 677, n.15.
19821
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datory bargaining is only effective if the subject under con-
sideration is one which is resolvable through the bargaining pro-
cess. The Court emphasized that management must be free from
the encumbrances of bargaining as far as is necessary to carry
on a profitable business, and must also be able to determine with
reasonable certainty when it may make a decision without fear
that its action will be labelled an unfair labor practice. 4 The
Court concluded that an employer should be required to bargain
over decisions substantially impacting on the availability of
employment only if the advantages to the labor-management
relationship are greater than the hardships placed on the ad-
ministration of business."
The Court noted that it had used such an analysis in
Fibreboard Paper Products v. NLRB36 to determine that the
employer's decision to subcontract work was a subject of man-
datory bargaining. 7 The Fibreboard Court had looked at: 1)
whether or not a capital investment was contemplated, 2)
whether the issue is one suitable for resolution through collec-
tive bargaining, and 3) the prevalence of bargaining over this
issue throughout the industry.38 Applying this approach to
FNM's decision to close a portion of a business for economic
reasons, the Court emphasized that it was important to consider
whether requiring bargaining over such a decision would ad-
vance the purposes of the Act.39 Justice Blackmun observed that
although the union is legitimately concerned about job security,
its practical purpose in wanting to participate in the decision is
to halt or delay the closing. The Court recognized, however,
that the union must be given a chance to bargain over the effects
34. Id. at 678-79. The purpose of labelling a particular practice a subject of
mandatory bargaining is to promote the fundamental aims of the Act by bring-
ing an important labor-management concern into the framework established by
Congress for the maintenance of industrial peace. The Court noted that Con-
gress did not explicitly exclude any issues from mandatory bargaining. Id. at
678 & n.16.
35. Id. at 679.
36. 379 U.S. 203 (1964). See infra notes 61-66 and accompanying text.
37. 452 U.S. at 679-80.
38. Id. at 679-80. See also 379 U.S. at 211-14.
39. 452 U.S. at 680-81. The Act is intended to foster in a neutral manner a
system by which the conflicts between union and management interests may be
resolved. Id. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
40. 452 U.S. at 681.
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of the partial closing on the employees." The Court
acknowledged that the union interest in fairness is protected by
section 8(a)(3) of the Act which prohibits closings motivated by
anti-union animus and which allows the Board to investigate the
motivations behind a partial closing decision.42
In assessing management's interest in bargaining, the Court
observed that where labor costs are an important factor in a
closing, management will have an incentive to voluntarily discuss
alternatives and compromises that would make continuation of
the business a profitable venture. Where management has a
great need for speed and flexibility in meeting its business
demands, however, tax considerations, the unfavorable publicity
that bargaining may attract, and the possibility that bargaining
may prove futile and cause the employer greater hardships
discourage the employer from bargaining.43
Justice Blackmun emphasized that a crucial distinction exists
between permissive and mandatory bargaining and acknowl-
edged that labelling a partial closing decision a mandatory sub-
ject accords to unions the power to circumvent management's in-
tentions by engaging in bargaining as a delaying tactic. He
acknowledged that while evidence of current labor practices is
only one indication of what is feasible, labor contracts rarely con-
tain provisions granting a right to bargain over changes in the
scope of business operations."
The Court rejected the court of appeals' presumption that a
duty to bargain exists" failing to promote harmonious relations
41. Id. "Effects bargaining" is mandated by section 158(a)(5) of the Act. Id.
See supra note 10. See also Royal Printing Plating, 350 F.2d 191 (1965); Adams
Dairy, 350 F.2d 108 (1965). Given the opportunity to bargain over the effects of
a partial closing decision, a union may be able to gain concessions from the
employer while also securing rights to notice, information, and fair bargaining.
452 U.S. at 681-82. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
42. Id. at 682. See National Labor Relations Act, as amended section
158(a)(3) (1976) which provides in pertinent part: [1It shall be an unfair labor
practice for an employer by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of
employment to encourage or discouage membership in any labor organization..."
Justice Blackmun admonished that an employer cannot be permitted to close
part of a business under the guise of economic necessity when the closing is ac-
tually motivated by anti-union animus. 452 U.S. at 682.
43. Id. at 682-83. Justice Blackmun observed that where there is no alter-
native to the closing bargaining may be both futile and costly. Id.
44. Id. at 683.
45. See 627 F.2d at 601-02. See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
1982]
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between employer and employee. Justice Blackmun observed
that if this presumption were used, employers would have dif-
ficulty assessing whether a situation required bargaining, deter-
mining the point at which the duty to bargain would arise, and
ascertaining the extent of bargaining that would be sufficient."
He noted that a union would also have difficulty in assessing
when it could employ economic tactics to influence an employer's
decision without subjecting itself to the Board's sanctions.47
Justice Blackmun therefore concluded that the harm likely to be
done to an employer's prerogative to close for economic reasons
outweighed the benefit the union could gain through bargaining,
and that a partial closing decision was not one of section 8(d)'s
mandatory bargaining subjects.48
Justice Blackmun distinguished the instant case from First Na-
tional because FNM had no intention of replacing discharged
employees or moving elsewhere; no anti-union animus claim was
made by the union; and the dispute with Greenpark was solely
over the size of the fee, a factor over which the union had not
control.49 Moreover, the Court found no abrogation on the part of
the employer of an existing bargaining agreement." The Court
determined that although FNM did not invest large amounts of
capital at its locations, the absence of significant withdrawal of
capital was not crucial.51
In a dissenting opinion, 2 Justice Brennan agreed with the ma-
jority that the issue presented by First National is whether
FNM's decison to discontinue work at its Greenpark operation
and discharge the employees was a mandatory subject of
46. 452 U.S. at 684-85. If an employer decided not to bargain, the Board
might conclude that the employer had violated its good faith duty by engaging
in "surface bargaining". Id. at 685. See NLRB v. Reed and Prince Manufactur-
ing Co., 205 F.2d 131 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 887 (1953).
47. 452 U.S. at 685-86. A union's failure to request meetings may be con-
sidered to constitute a waiver of the right to bargain. Id. See Shell Oil Co., 149
N.L.R.B. 305 (1965).
48. Id. at 686.
49. Id. at 687.
50. Id. ,at 688. The union was not certified as the bargaining agent until
after FNM's financial difficulties had begun. Id. See supra note 6.
51. Id. at 688. The Court found FNM's decision to close the Greenpark
operations analogous to the opening of a new line of business or closing a
business entirely. Id.
52. Justice Marshall joined Justice Brennan in the dissent.
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bargaining pursuant to section 8(d) of the Act.' He disagreed,
however, with the majority's use of a balancing test for resovling
the issue.' He reasoned that the majority's test was highly
speculative because the Court provided no evidence to support is
contention that the benefits of bargaining to the union would
have been minimal.55 Justice Brennan added that when
employees are given a change to bargain, compromises are often
made at the bargaining table which enable the company to re-
main in operation, even in situations where labor costs are not at
the source of a company's difficulties.' He further disagreed
with the majority's presumption that the employer's need for
speed and flexibility in a partial closing situation would be
hampered by a bargaining requirement, reasoning that in some
cases the decision will be made openly and such considerations
will be unimportant.57
Justice Brennan stated that the Board, not the Court, was
responsible for determining the scope of the statutory duty to
bargain in partial closing decisions.' He therefore assented to
the court of appeals' rebuttable presumption analysis59 because
he believed it was supported by recent Board decisions."0
A partial closing occurs when a company that operates two or
more plants chooses to close one of them while keeping the
others open, or when the company discontinues a distinct portion
of its operations in one plant. The difficulties encountered in
determining when a partial closing decision is a mandatory sub-
ject of bargaining are exemplified by the Supreme Court's
53. 452 U.S. 688 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See supra note 11.
54. 452 U.S. at 689-90. (Brennan, J., dissenting). See supra note 36 and ac-
companying text.
55. 452 U.S. at 690. (Brennan, J., dissenting). He also criticized the majori-
ty's use of a balancing test as failing to account for the employees' legitimate
employment interests. Id.
56. Id. Justice Brennan referred to negotiations between Chrysler and the
United Auto Workers which led to advantageous results and allowed Chrysler
to remain in business. Id.
57. Id. at 690-91, (Brennan, J., dissenting). He also noted that because ef-
fects bargaining is mandatory, it was difficult to see why bargaining over the
decision itself would have an adverse effect. Id. at 691.
58. Id. at 691. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
59. Id. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
60. Id. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
19821 509
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decisions in Fibreboard Paper Products v. NLRB61 and Textile
Workers Union v. Darlington Manufacturing Co.6 2
In Fibreboard, the employer contended that maintenance work
performed by employees within the plant could be done at less
cost through a subcontractor. It therefore decided to subcontract
the work and terminate the employment of the maintenance
employees at the plant when their labor contract expired. The
Supreme Court concluded that requiring the employer to bargain
would promote the major tenets of the Act68 and held that the
dismissals were mandatory bargaining subjects. In a concurring
opinion, Justice Stewart emphasized that the case involved a
mere substitution of one group of workers for another64 and cau-
tioned that other types of subcontracting practices or investment
decisions would not be subject to the duty to bargain. Although
Fibreboard established the principle that the duty to bargain at-
taches to certain management decisions regarding operational
changes, the decision's scope was unclear because the majority
cautioned that the law in this area should be developed on a
case-by-case basis.6
One year after Fibreboard, the Supreme Court in Darlington"
held that an employer has a right to close his entire business,
even because of anti-union sentiments. However, a partial clos-
61. 379 U.S. 203 (1964). See supra note 36.
62. 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
63. 379 U.S. at 211.
64. Id. at 217 (Stewart, J., concurring).
65. Id. at 224. (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart emphasized that
the Fibreboard holding should not be understood to impose a duty to bargain
regarding managerial decisions which lie at the core of entreprenurial control.
Id.
66. Id. at 213. See Heinsz, The Partial Closing Conundrum: The Duty of
Employers and Unions To Bargain in Good Faith, 71 DUKE L.J. 71,77 (1981).
The question remained after Fibreboard whether its holding would be limited
to that particular factual situation or would be expanded to cover other types
of subcontracting arrangements, such as the moving of a plant to another loca-
tion or the partial shutdown of a business. Id.
67. 380 U.S. 263 (1965). In Darlington, the Textile Workers Union won an
election at the plant and asked the company to bargain. The board of directors
voted to close the plant, discharge the employees, and sell the equipment. The
Board found that the closing was motivated by anti-union sentiments and was
therefore unlawful. See 139 N.L.R.B. 241, 243 (1962).
68. 380 U.S. at 273-74. The Court reasoned that an employer, even if
motivated by spite for the union, can obtain no future benefit by completely
closing its enterprise. Id. at 269-74.
[Vol. 20:501
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ing in one plant by a multiple plant employer is subject to sec-
tion 8(a)(3)69 if the Board can show that the effect of the closing
was to discourage unionism, and that the employer could reason-
ably foresee that employees in his other plants would fear a
similar closing if they continued to engage in union activities."
An employer will seldom be required to bargain over partial
plant shutdowns under Darlington because the burden of prov-
ing that a closing was actually motivated by anti-union animus is
a heavy one: an employer can usually find some economic justifi-
cation for closing a plant." Although the Supreme Court decided
the case under section 8(a)(3), rather than under section 8(a)(5),
Darlington did delineate one area in which bargaining over a par-
tial closing was required. 2
Also in 1965, the Third and Eighth Circuits found that
employers have no legal obligation to bargain over partial clos-
ings. In NLRB v. Royal Plating and Polishing Co.,73 the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit held that in each case involving a
partial closing, the interests of the employees and the purpose of
securing industrial tranquility must be carefully balanced against
the right of an employer to run his business. 4 The court found
that the decision to close one of the plants was a major invest-
ment decision rather than a mere substitution of employees as in
Fibreboard."5 The court concluded that an employer faced with
the economic necessity of either moving or consolidating the
operations of a failing business has no duty to bargain with the
union respecting its decision to shut down."
69. See supra note 42.
70. Id at 275-76.
71. See Heinsz, supra note 66, at 97.
72. The Board found that the company violated section 8(a)(1) by dismissing
the employees after the decision to close, and it violated section 8(a)(5) by refus-
ing to honor the union's request to bargain after the decision to liquidate. The
Supreme Court eliminated any consideration of sections 8(a)(1) and (5), however,
by noting that the propriety of the Board's conclusion about these violations
turned on whether the decision to close transgressed section 8(a)(3). See 380
U.S. at 266-67, nn.5-6.
73. 350 F.2d 191 (3d Cir. 1965). The company decided, without bargaining
with the union, to sell one of its plants due to the threat of condemnation pro-
ceedings by a local government. Id
74. Id at 195.
75. Id at 196. For a discussion of the investment analysis, see infra notes
97-107 and accompanying text.
76. 350 F.2d at 196.
1982]
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In NLRB v. Adams Dairy, Inc..," the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit held that a change in basic operating procedures
took place when the dairy liquidated that part of its business
handling distribution of milk products. Unlike the situation in
Fibreboard, there was a change in the capital structure of the
Adams Dairy which resulted in a recoupment of capital invest-
ment. The court reasoned that to require the dairy to bargain
about its decision to close out the distribution end of its business
would specifically abridge its freedom to manage its own
affairs. 8
In 1978, the Third Circuit in Brockway Motor Trucks v.
NLRB" attempted to resolve two conflicting principles-the
right of the entrepreneur to control capital assets and the
statutory rights of workers to bargain collectively with their
employer over conditions affecting their jobs. The Brockway
court concluded that a partial closing that resulted in termination
fell within the literal statutory language of affecting "terms and
conditions of employment" and that a presumption in favor of
bargaining existed. The court stated, however, that the presump-
tion can be rebutted by a showing that when the competing in-
terests of the employer and the employees are weighed, the
employer's interests prevail.
While the courts of appeals have looked at the partial closing
decision primarily from the management's perspective, the Board
has emphasized the employee's interests. In 1966, the Board in
Ozark found that the failure to bargain over the decision to close
one part of the company's operations violated section 8(a)(5) even
though the decision was made, for purely economic reasons.8 The
77. 350 F.2d 108 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1011 (1966). See
supra note 32.
78. 350 F.2d at 111. The case was factually distinguished from Darlington
because no anti-union animus was found. Id.
79. 582 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1978). Brockway was engaged in the manufacture,
sale, and service of trucks with locations throughout Pennsylvania and other
states. When no agreement on a new contract could be reached at its
Philadelphia plant, Brockway announced its decision to close the plant. Id. at
722.
80. Id at 723. The Third Circuit remanded the case to the Board for fact-
finding into the circumstances behind the partial closing. 251 L.R.R.M. 1515
(1980).
81. The Ozark plant was closed and dismantled for economic reasons. The
union did not receive notice or an opportunity to bargain with respect to the ef-
fects of the decision upon the employees.
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Board rejected the investment analysis as a justification for a
partial closing decision,"2 emphasizing that a decision to close has
as great an effect on the employee's protection of his livelihood
as it does an employer's capital investment.83 The Board conclud-
ed that bargaining to a solution will promote a means of keeping
the plant open and retaining jobs and would thereby promote the
harmony sought by the Act."
In 1971, the Board in General Motors Corp. 5 announced an ex-
ception to its holdings that an employer must bargain over par-
tial closings. The Board decided that the decision by General
Motors to sell a manufacturer-owned dealership was not a man-
datory subject of bargaining even though the sale caused several
employees to lost their jobs. Unlike the most previous Board
opinions, General Motors emphasized the withdrawal of capital
and the change in the scope of business that resulted from the
decision to sell, rather than the loss of jobs it caused."8
In 1974, The Board in Royal Typewriter,7 returned to its
Ozark position," holding that a partial closing and relocation was
a mandatory subject of bargaining.89 The Board found that the
company's notice to the union of the possible termination of
manufacture at one plant but continued manufacture of products
at another factory in the United States, approximately one week
before the final closing, was inadequate.' The Board in
Brockway Motor Trucks"' reiterated its basic position that in a
partial closing case an employer's decision made without bargain-
ing violated section 8(a)(5). The Board also noted, however, that
the company had not shown that its decision involved such a sig-
82. See 161 N.L.R.B. at 566. See R. GORMAN, LABOR LAW, UNIONIZATION,
AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 518 (1976).
83. 161 N.L.R.B. at 566.
84. Id
85. 191 N.L.R.B. 951 (1971), enforced sub. nom. UAW Local 864 v. NLRB,
470 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
86. 191 N.L.R.B. at 953.
87. 209 N.L.R.B. 1006 (1974), aff'd 533 F.2d 1030 (8th Cir. 1976).
88. The Board distinguished General Motors because it involved an
economic decision to sell an independent dealership, whereas in Royal
Typewriter, the company had decided to close one of its plants but to continue
manufacturing similar products at another facility.
89. See 209 N.L.R.B. at 1012.
90. Id at 1012-13.




nificant investment or withdrawal of capital that it affected the
scope and direction of the enterprise." The present posture of
the Board appears to require decision-bargaining over an eco-
nomically motivated partial closing when the company would not
be entirely removing itself from a particular line of business in
so closing and there is no necessity to do so to protect fixed
capital."
The First National Court's employment of a balancing test and
determination that the interests of management in exercising its
prerogatives outweighed the possible advantages that the union
could gain through bargaining is consistent with the court of ap-
peals' pro-management decision. 4 The Court's holding represents
a clear rejection of the Board's "prevailing interests of
employee" analysis95 and an adoption of an approach emphasizing
the employer's need to operate freely in decision-making. 6
In deciding whether a particular decision by management
should be a mandatory subject of bargaining, two conflicting in-
terests should be considered: (1) the importance of maintaining
equality of bargaining strength between labor and management;
and (2) the need to protect capital investment decisions from the
influence of labor. 7 Courts and the Board, in deciding which in-
terest should prevail in a case should ask what would best serve
the long-run interests of the economy. A rule requiring an
employer to bargain over every decision would so decrease
economic efficiency that in the long run the depressed economic
92. Id. at 1003. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
93. See M. Perkins, Economically Motivated Partial Closings: The Duty of
Management to Decision-Bargain, 31 LAB. L.J. 700, 702 (1980).
94. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
95. See supra notes 81-92 and accompanying text.
96. See 452 U.S. at 674-80.
97. See M. Goldman, "Partial Terminations": A Choice Between Bargain-
ing Equality and Economic Efficiency, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1089 (1967).
98. Accordingly, a recurrent theme in the partial closing decision cases is
the investment analysis which recognizes that it is essential to the proper func-
tioning of the economy that capital be free to flow from one use to another. See
R. LEFTWICH, THE PRICE SYSTEM AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION at 326 (Rev. ed.
1963):
Not only does the free flow of capital cause the economy to adjust to the
desires of the consumer but reallocating a given amount of capital from a
low yielding use to a higher yielding use results in a net increment to na-
tional income and given a fixed amount of resources, increases the effi-
ciency of the enterprise and the economy.
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conditions would make labor worse off than without such a rule.
Also, complete equality of bargaining strength would allow labor
to participate in decisions best left to the judgment of manage-
ment, the optimum balance of bargaining power between labor
and management must, of necessity, be left in favor of the
employer to the extent of preventing labor's participation in
reallocation decisions."
It has been suggested that the distinction between fixed and
working capital offers a means for compromising the interests of
labor with the advantages to be gained from economic
efficiency.1"0 Fixed capital is invested in fixed assets like plants
and equipment; working capital consists of cash and short-term
investments which provide money and payment for wages. '
Those labor demands that relate only to working capital, such as
wages or pension benefits, should be included as subjects of collec-
tive bargaining because such demands are of great importance to
labor and their inclusion is not severely detrimental to economic
efficiency."' A partial closing that involves liquidating a fixed
capital investment in plant and equipment evidences the em-
ployer's belief that the overall return on his investment is insuf-
ficient to justify continued operations at the particular location,
and therefore, should be immune from collective bargaining.10 3
When the return on capital falls below the point at which the
employer chooses to operate that portion of his business in ques-
tion, insulating the decision to partially terminate operations is
advantageous to the economy because it prevents labor from
forcing the employer to remain in business to produce goods or
services for which there is no longer a sufficient profit. This ap-
proach leaves partial closing decisions that affect only working
capital to the bargaining process. '
The Third and Eighth Circuits have adopted the "fixed versus
working capital" distinction as one means of determining when
99. See Goldman, supra note 97, at 1093.
100. Id at 1096.
101. Id. at 1095.
102. Id. at 1096.
103. Id at 1096 n.35.
104. Id. The distinction between working and fixed capital cannot be used to
distinguish between mandatory and nonmandatory subjects in general because
every decision which affects working capital should not be a mandatory subject




mandatory bargaining will be required and have held that a par-
tial closing decision is not a subject of mandatory bargaining."'
Moreover, the Third Circuit in Brockway, although holding that
a rebuttable presumption in favor of bargaining existed, pointed
to the fact that in balancing the interests of the employer and
employee to rebut the presumption, the capital investment
analysis was useful. ' While the Board has recognized this ap-
proach, it has rejected its use in determining whether or not a
particular management decision must be the subject of bargain-
ing.
10 7
Although the Supreme Court in First National did not adopt
the capital investment analysis, its balancing test represents at
least a recognition of the approach. The Court did weigh the in-
terests of the employer and employee and concluded that FNM
did not have a duty to bargain over the continuance of opera-
tions at Greenpark when the contractual agreement was no
longer profitable. In doing so, the Court relied on the importance
of the management prerogative in decision-making."8 The opin-
ion, however, failed to develop the impact that a significant
capital investment would have on its balancing test. The Court
noted that the absence of a capital investment was not crucial;
yet, the courts of appeal and the Board have recognized this ap-
proach in their decision-making.10'9 The presence or absence of
capital investment is an important factor throughout the partial
closing cases and is an essential element of the Fibreboard
analysis which was relied upon by the Court. ' Therefore, the
precedential value of First National is indeed questionable, in
regards to those partial closings which involve significant capital
reallocation. Although the Court adequately distinguished
Fibreboard by concluding that the decision to terminate the
105. See NLRB v. Adams Dairy, Inc., 350 F.2d 108 (8th Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 1011 (1966). See supra notes 77-78. See also NLRB v. Royal
Plating and Polishing Co., 350 F.2d 191 (3d Cir. 1965). See supra notes 73-76.
106. See 582 F.2d at 723. See supra notes 79-80. The First National Court
clearly rejected the presumption analysis, reasoning that such an approach
would not promote harmonious employer-employee relationships because an
employer would never be sure whether he could safely run the risk of choosing
not to bargain. 101 S. Ct. at 2583.
107. See Goldman, supra note 97, at 1103. See Ozark Trailers, Inc., 161
N.L.R.B. 566 (1966). See supra notes 81-82.
108. See 452 U.S. at 674-80.
109. See supra notes 81-92.
110. See 101 S. Ct. at 2579-82.
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Greenpark operations represented a significant change in opera-
tions rather than a mere substitution of one group of workers for
another,"' only future partial closing cases will reveal First Na-
tional's effect.
Collective bargaining may be looked upon as the extension of
basic principles and practices of democracy into industry.2 The
sponsor of the original version of the Act made it plain in his
opening statement to Congress in 1934 that the Act was aimed
at least as much at changing the distribution of wealth between
labor and management as at promoting efficient capital flow."3
Today, however, the courts in deciding which interest should
prevail, put a greater emphasis on which would best serve the
long-run interest of the economy."4
As the number of business shutdowns increases because of
economic difficulties, the issue of whether employers must
negotiate with unions over a decision to close a plant assumes
greater importance. Where the importance of insulating capital
expenditures from the influence of labor outweighs the possible
adverse effects on union bargaining strength, it necessarily
follows that the decision must be immune from collective
bargaining."' An adoption of the "balancing of interests" test as
proposed by the First National Court is a starting point for the
implementation of a uniform set of rules under which the Board
and the courts can operate. However, such a balancing test does
not appear to be any more predictable than the rebuttable
presumption analysis adopted by the Third Circuit.' The task of
balancing the employee's need for continued employment against
the employer's need for freedom in decision-making is difficult,
and the First National decision leaves the courts with almost
unlimited discretion in deciding which interest will prevail.
Carol A. Behers
111. Id at 2578-85.
112. See C. GOLDEN AND H. RUTENBERG, THE DYNAMICS OF INDUSTRIAL
DEMOCRACY, 374 (1942).
113. See 78 CONG. REC. 3443 (1934) (Remarks of Sen. Wagner): "[Ilt is
necessary to insure a wise distribution of wealth between management and
labor, to maintain a full flow of purchasing power and prevent recurrent depres-
sions."
114. See Goldman, supra note 97, at 1090.
115. Id.
116. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
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